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Abstract 
This paper studies the importance of intangible barriers to trade in explaining variation in 
disaggregate international trade. The analysis is based on a sample of 55 countries for the year 
2000. We explicitly focus on the importance of institutional and cultural dimensions of 
distance. Our results reveal there is substantial heterogeneity in the impact of intangible 
barriers for different product groups. More specifically, we find that cultural differences do 
not affect total trade significantly, whereas trade in homogeneous goods is significantly 
negatively affected. A possible explanation for this pattern is that the substitution effect 
between trade and FDI is stronger for more differentiated products. 
 
JEL code:  F14 
Keywords :  bilateral trade, gravity model, intangible barriers, cultural distance, sectoral 
trade 
 
                                               
1
 Corresponding author: Henri L.F. de Groot, VU University Amsterdam, Department of Spatial Economics, De 
Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands, tel: +31 20 598 6168, fax: +31 20 598 6004, email: 
hgroot@feweb.vu.nl. We are grateful to Andrés Rodríguez-Pose and participants of the 2007 conference “The 
Gravity Equation – Or: Why the World is Not Flat” in Groningen for useful comments on an earlier version of 
this paper. The usual disclaimer applies. 
 
 2 
1. Introduction 
International trade flows have increased impressively in the last few decades. Data from the 
United Nations, which have been edited by Feenstra et al. (2005), suggest that the aggregate 
nominal value of reported international trade increased from about 130 billion USD in 1962 to 
more than 6.5 trillion USD in 2000. This corresponds to an annual growth rate close to 11%. 
With an estimated world population of about 6 billion in 2000, this implies that international 
trade per capita was over 1,000 USD or about 15% of the average Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) per capita. 
The growing importance of international trade has led to an increased need for sound 
analyses of its determinants. The gravity model has been the workhorse model to explain 
international trade flows for nearly half a century now. The main idea behind this model is 
that the magnitude of bilateral trade flows can be explained by the economic size of the two 
trading countries and the distance between them (Deardorff, 1998). The model has sound 
theoretical foundations, yields almost invariantly plausible parameter estimates and has a 
strong explanatory power.  
Although the basic framework of the gravity model is unaltered throughout the years, 
new insights have contributed to its increasing popularity by improving its theoretical 
underpinnings (see, e.g., Feenstra, 2004) and addressing econometric issues concerning the 
correct specification of the model (see, e.g., Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004). These 
include the correct specification of the multilateral resistance (price) effect, the specification 
of panel gravity equations and the treatment of zero-valued bilateral trade flows.  
Despite the rapid growth of trade and the popular discussions on the ‘death of 
distance’ (e.g., Cairncross, 1997; Friedman, 2005), many studies estimating gravity equations 
of bilateral trade confirm that the impact of geographic distance is still large and has not 
shown a clear tendency to decline over time (e.g., Linders, 2006; Disdier and Head, 2008). 
Thus, distance still matters for the patterns of trade. Given the decline in transport and 
communication costs over time, this finding provides support for the view that intangible 
trade barriers are persistent and are important in explaining the resistance to trade (Obstfeld 
and Rogoff, 2000; Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004). 
Substantiating the effect of intangible trade barriers has been another important recent 
extension of the gravity model. Most of the early gravity model studies consider only 
geographical distance. However, it is likely that there are significant additional costs involved 
in trading besides transport costs. Deardorff (2004) suggests that the current amount of global 
trade is far below the level that would prevail if transport costs were the only costs of trading. 
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Furthermore, Trefler (1995) and Davis et al. (1997) find that the factor proportions theory of 
trade would predict trade flows that are missing from actual observations. They argue that 
home bias in preferences may explain this ‘mystery of missing trade’. The missing trade 
flows might partly originate from alternative dimensions of distance in trade. These other 
dimensions of distance could include cultural and institutional distances. Den Butter and 
Mosch (2003) and Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) state that the transaction costs of 
trading can include many aspects including transport costs, tariffs, search costs, information 
costs regarding the product and the reliability of the trading partner, and contract enforcement 
costs. These transaction costs are likely to increase with the cultural gap between countries 
because firms will have less knowledge about foreign cultures and markets. Moreover, the 
costs of negotiation will be higher when the trading partners do not speak the same language 
(cf. Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002). This is why more recent studies include measures for 
cultural and institutional distance (see, for example, Den Butter and Mosch, 2003; De Groot 
et al., 2004; Linders et al., 2005) in their gravity model specifications.  
What has remained unchanged in the application of the gravity model is the strong 
focus on total trade flows. This is surprising, as there are good reasons to believe that the 
effects of distance and GDP on the value of bilateral trade differ between different product 
groups. An important exception is the seminal study by Rauch (1999) in which a 
network/search view of international trade is developed. He argues that search costs present a 
major barrier to trade in differentiated products, whereas distance only increases transport 
costs for trade in homogeneous products without principally preventing trade. These 
hypotheses are empirically tested by estimating models for both homogeneous and 
heterogeneous products, providing empirical support for the hypotheses. 
In this study we build on the work of Rauch (1999) by estimating the gravity model 
for different product groups. We improve and extend his empirical work in a number of 
directions. First, we incorporate new econometric insights. More specifically, we use the 
Heckman selection model to estimate the gravity equation. This model is able to deal with 
zero trade flows in a more satisfactory way, which becomes particularly relevant when 
studying disaggregate trade because of the increased absence of trade of specific products 
between pairs of countries. Second, we use a broader view on the different dimensions of 
distance. Rauch (1999) hypothesises that networks are an important factor in trade 
transactions. and that a common language or a shared colonial history will make networks 
more likely to exist. Besides geographical distance, Rauch uses a dummy variable indicating 
whether two countries share a common language or a shared colonial history to test this view. 
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However, this variable does not capture the idea that transaction costs increase when firms 
have less knowledge about foreign cultures and markets due to cultural differences. In this 
study we include additional cultural indicators to test this hypothesis as well. Third, we 
explore the importance of using different product categories for the parameters of the gravity 
equation. For that purpose we extend the analysis of Rauch by exploring the impact on 
different sectors of the economy and on specific products. In addition we use data covering a 
more recent time period (viz. 2000).  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the 
basic concept of the gravity model for bilateral trade. Section 3 elaborates on the importance 
of intangible barriers to trade, with a special focus on cultural and institutional distance. Data 
and estimation method are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 presents the results. This section 
consists of three parts. The first part strictly follows the distinction made by Rauch (1999) 
between homogeneous and heterogeneous products and considers the impact of more recent 
data and different estimation techniques on the key results obtained by Rauch. The second 
part focuses on the importance of intangible barriers to trade. The last part applies the gravity 
model to more detailed product groups. Finally, section 6 presents the conclusions and 
provides some further discussion. 
 
2. The gravity model in international trade 
The gravity model of bilateral trade has become the workhorse model of applied international 
economics (Eichengreen and Irwin, 1998). It was originally inspired by Newton’s gravity 
equation in physics, in which the gravitational forces exerted between two bodies depend on 
their mass and distance. The basic idea of gravity can be used to model spatial interaction in 
social sciences as well. The gravity model has been used extensively in regional science to 
describe and analyse spatial flows of information, goods and persons (see, e.g., Greenwood, 
1975; Nijkamp and Reggiani, 1992; Isard, 1999), and was pioneered in the analysis of 
international trade by Tinbergen (1962), Pöyhönen (1963) and Linnemann (1966). 
The traditional gravity model relates bilateral trade flows to the GDP levels of the 
countries and their geographic distance. The levels of GDP reflect the market size in both 
countries, as a measure of ‘economic mass’. The market size of the importing country reflects 
the potential demand for bilateral imports, while GDP in the exporting country represents the 
potential supply of goods from that country; geographic distance reflects resistance to 
bilateral trade. The familiar functional form from physics is then used to relate bilateral trade 
to these variables of economic mass and distance. 
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Usually, the gravity equation is expressed in logarithmic form, for the purpose of 
empirical estimation. The basic gravity equation, used in estimation, then looks as follows: 
  
 ijijijijijijijij IDCDMDyYKT εθθδλβα +++++++= 21lnlnlnlnln , (1) 
 
where Tij stands for exports from country i to country j; K is a scalar; Yij and yij represent the 
product of GDP and GDP per capita of country i and j; and Dij, CDij and IDij reflect physical, 
cultural and institutional distance between the countries. The matrix Mij contains additional 
variables that may affect the ease of trading bilaterally, such as a common border, linguistic 
or colonial links, and common trade bloc membership (such as the EU and NAFTA). In 
specifying this basic structure of the model, we largely follow the model set out in Rauch 
(1999). In estimating the model, we conform as much as possible to the country sample of 
Rauch (1999). This serves to facilitate the comparison of results. Our key parameters of 
interest are θ1 and θ2 capturing the effect of, respectively, cultural and institutional distance on 
trade. Finally, εij is a disturbance term that reflects the impact of other factors (assumed 
orthogonal) that have not been included in the model.  
The recent literature has provided extensions to the theoretical foundations of the 
gravity model (see, for example, Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003; Feenstra, 2004; 
Anderson, 2007). This has resulted in a modification of the gravity equation (1), to account 
for omitted variable bias related to the omission of multilateral resistance terms Pi and Pj, 
which are themselves a function of all regressor variables (e.g., Yk, Yl , Mkl and Dkl) for all 
countries k and l.  
The resulting equation, also indicated as the theoretical gravity equation, is of the 
form: 
 
ijjiijijijijijijij PPIDCDMDyYKT εθθδλβα σσ +−−++++++= −− 1121 lnlnlnlnlnlnln , (2) 
 
where σ stands for a preference parameter (in the theoretical derivations equal to the elasticity 
of substitution between goods from different countries). Because the logged multilateral 
resistance terms are non-linear functions of the variables and parameters in the model, this 
gravity equation cannot be estimated by OLS. A number of solutions has been proposed for 
estimation. In our analysis, we will proceed in line with Feenstra (2004) to estimate a gravity 
equation in which the multilateral resistance terms are estimated as country-specific fixed 
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effects. We assume that trade costs are symmetric, implying that we assume the existence of a 
single country-specific multilateral resistance term for each country.2  
 
3. Multidimensional distance: institutions, culture and trade 
The point of departure for our analysis is the observation that trade costs are important to 
understand the patterns of bilateral trade. Bilateral resistance to trade can arise from formal 
barriers (tariffs, NTBs) and transport costs, but also from informal barriers such as differences 
in institutional quality and in cultural norms and values. Moreover, these barriers to trade may 
be more important for some products than for others. This paper focuses on these intangible 
barriers to trade, and asks the question: ‘Do institutional and cultural distance affect trade 
differentially across different (groups of) products?’ 
 
3.1 The network view on trade 
To understand how trade patterns evolve, recent research points at the importance of 
networks, rather than atomistic markets (e.g., Rauch, 1999; 2001). The search/network view 
starts from the observation that a majority of products is not traded on organized exchanges. 
Therefore, search processes are important in order to match buyers and sellers. Networks 
serve to facilitate the search for suitable trade partners. As a result, understanding the 
characteristics and development of networks is important to explain the observed patterns of 
trade. 
Rauch (1999) classifies products according to product type. Homogeneous products 
differ from differentiated goods in the use of ‘markets’ as opposed to ‘networks’ for 
exchange. Homogeneous goods can be compared exclusively on the basis of price differences. 
Several homogeneous products are traded on an organized exchange where supply and 
demand directly confront and match. Many other homogeneous products are sold on a 
decentralized market where the ‘invisible hand’ of the price mechanism takes care of co-
ordination. Although not frictionless, matching resembles a perfectly competitive centralized 
market, where the comparison is based on prices as the only relevant characteristic. For these 
products, reference prices are often published, illustrating that the price mechanism guides 
allocation through the possibility for international arbitrage of price differences. 
Differentiated products cannot be compared on the basis of prices alone. Price differences 
                                               
2
 Allowing for asymmetric trade costs, hence different multilateral resistance terms for exports and imports, does 
not lead to major changes in the OLS estimation. With the Heckman selection model we had to rely on a single 
indicator of multilateral resistance per country for technical reasons, since a solution could not be reached 
otherwise. 
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must be adjusted for differences in characteristics and quality between the varieties. The 
relative importance of the various characteristics differs across countries depending on the 
available supply and preferences that prevail (Rauch, 1999). In the end, each variety has its 
own unique blend of characteristics. The product is ‘branded’, and has its own supplier. 
Because of the difficulty of comparing differentiated products, differentiated products cannot 
be traded on organized exchanges. Moreover, information costs are so high that international 
arbitrage by specialized traders across varieties is not feasible either. Instead, differentiated 
products are traded through networks by search and match between traders, customers and 
suppliers. Rauch (1999) argues that the process of search is facilitated by factors that improve 
the information flow and knowledge of foreign markets. He refers to shared language, 
colonial links and geographical proximity as search-enabling factors, because they increase 
bilateral familiarity and decrease ‘psychic distance’ (see Frankel, 1997). 
Rauch (1999) identifies three product groups that reflect the ‘network versus market’ 
distinction in trade. Homogeneous products comprise two groups: products traded on an 
organized exchange and reference-priced articles; the third group consists of differentiated 
goods. The network theory of trade hypothesizes that search costs are most important for the 
pattern of trade in differentiated products and least important for organized-exchange 
products.  
 
3.2 Insecurity of property and trade 
An alternative explanation for unobserved trade costs focuses on variation in institutional 
effectiveness across countries. A poor institutional environment, in terms of property rights 
protection and contract enforceability, entails negative externalities for private transactions 
and consequently raises transaction costs. As a result, the quality of governance is an 
important determinant of economic growth and development (see, e.g., Olson, 1996). 
Institutional economics has recently been extended into the field of international economics 
(e.g., Wei, 2000; Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002; Dixit, 2004). This approach states that 
insecurity of property and contract enforcement imposes high costs on trade. Rodrik (2000) 
argues that the transaction-costs problem of contract enforcement is aggravated for 
international trade, compared to domestic exchange. International trade involves at least two 
jurisdictions, which makes contract enforcement more difficult. This discontinuity in the 
political and legal system increases uncertainty and the risk of opportunistic behaviour by 
either party to the exchange. Accordingly, differences in the effectiveness of legal and policy 
systems in providing law and order, securing contract enforcement and facilitating trade is an 
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important determinant of bilateral trade costs. Besides the level of the quality of institutions, 
the similarities of institutions between two countries could also affect bilateral trade costs. 
With more similar institutions enforcement of international contracts is easier and uncertainty 
is reduced (see, for example, De Groot et al., 2004). 
In this paper, we investigate whether the impact of differences in institutional quality 
on bilateral trade depends on the type of product that is being traded. We would generally 
expect the costs of insecurity and differences in contract enforceability to be lowest for 
organized-exchange products. Specialized traders can diversify systemic risk of opportunistic 
behaviour by ordering from many different suppliers, without any concern left for final 
customers. For reference-priced commodities, the need for more case-specific search raises 
search costs and creates an incentive to enter into closer relations. Trade will increasingly 
avoid environments with very different institutional settings. The largest effect is expected for 
trade in differentiated goods.  
 
3.3 Cultural differences as trade barrier 
Many studies have extended the basic trade-flow gravity equation with (dummy) variables 
indicating whether the trading partners share a common language, religion, and/or colonial 
past (e.g., Geraci and Prewo, 1977; Frankel, 1997; Boisso and Ferrantino, 1997; Yeyati, 2003; 
Guiso et al., 2004). Most studies find that these variables have significantly positive effects on 
the magnitude of international trade flows. Although this indicates that these variables matter, 
they only capture cultural familiarity, in the sense that the trading partners will have more 
knowledge of each others culture and will find it easier to communicate and share information 
(Rauch, 1999; 2001).  
We go beyond cultural familiarity by focusing on cultural distance, which is defined as 
the extent to which the shared norms and values in one country differ from those in another 
(Kogut and Singh, 1988; Hofstede, 2001). It is generally acknowledged that a large cultural 
distance raises the costs of international trade, as large cultural differences make it difficult to 
understand, control, and predict the behaviour of others (Elsass and Veiga, 1994). This 
complicates interactions (Parkhe, 1991), thus impeding the realization of business deals. 
Some of the most notable difficulties associated with cross-cultural interaction include those 
associated with understanding, and particularly those associated with differences in 
perceptions of the same situation. Differences in perceptions complicate interactions, make 
them prone to fail, and hinder the development of rapport and trust – factors that generally 
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facilitate the interaction process and lower the costs of trade (Neal, 1998). This suggests that a 
large cultural distance between countries reduces the amount of trade between them.  
However, cultural differences can also have a positive impact on trade. When entering 
foreign markets, companies have to decide whether to export products to another country or 
open a factory to start local production. The trade-off between producing locally and 
producing at a single site to benefit from scale advantages is known as the proximity-
concentration trade-off. The literature on trade and horizontal foreign direct investment (FDI) 
suggests that the trade off between various modes of serving foreign markets may result in a 
positive effect of cultural and institutional distance on trade (Brainard, 1997; Helpman et al., 
2004). An increase in cultural distance is likely to raise the costs of bilateral FDI more than 
the costs of bilateral trade, because FDI involves a higher stake in the local foreign market. 
Resource commitment, in the form of asset specific investments, is higher for FDI than for 
trade. Moreover, cultural differences are likely to affect the variable costs of direct local 
presence via FDI more than the cost of trading, as the transaction costs of managing and 
producing locally are relatively more substantial. If the costs resulting from cultural 
differences rise, companies may therefore prefer to focus on exports rather than FDI. This 
may lead to a substitution of local presence by trade. The total effect of cultural distance on 
trade then consists of a direct, negative effect and a positive substitution effect from FDI to 
trade. The total effect could therefore be either positive or negative.3  
Cultural diversity can also have a positive influence on international trade through 
specialisation. Wherever there are big differences between countries, there are larger 
opportunities for specialising in the production of specific goods, which can be exchanged via 
international trade. In the end, the effect of cultural distance on trade is an empirical question. 
 
4. Data and estimation method 
 
4.1 Trade data  
As the dependent variable we use bilateral exports between two countries measured in 
thousands of US dollars. For this variable we used the database complied by Feenstra et al. 
(2005), which is based on trade data from the United Nations. The database covers bilateral 
                                               
3
 Export and FDI can be substitutes in case of horizontal FDI (sales to the local market). Although the bulk of 
FDI is horizontal in nature, (see, for example, Brakman et al., 2007), vertical FDI has increased due to 
fragmentation of production. In this case, trade and FDI act as complements. Hence we would expect a negative 
effect of cultural and institutional distance on both vertical FDI and trade. Therefore, this type of FDI does not 
lead to a positive substitution effect from FDI to trade. A similar reasoning applies to international outsourcing 
and resulting trade. 
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trade between 1962 and 2000. For the purpose of this study only cross-section data is 
required, so we only used data for the year 2000. 
The data are classified according to the Standard International Trade Classification 
(SITC) revision 2 at the 4-digit level. The SITC is a system that provides codes for product 
types. At the 4-digit level there can be a maximum of 10,000 different codes. In practice there 
are less than 10,000 because not all numbers are being used.  
 To compare our results with Rauch (1999) we use the same set of countries as he did, 
as far as possible. The 55 remaining countries are listed in the Appendix. It is possible that the 
value of a trade flow reported by the exporter differs from the trade flow reported by the 
importer. When this is the case the value reported by the importer is used because this data is 
generally more reliable (Feenstra et al., 2005). When there is no record from the importing 
country available we use the record from the exporting country.  
According to the database, the total amount of trade in 2000 between the 55 countries 
used in this study was about 5.3 trillion US dollars. The three Rauch groups, viz. 
differentiated goods (N), reference priced goods (R) and goods that are traded on an organized 
exchange (W) account for, respectively, 64%, 16% and 10% of total trade. These shares do 
not add up to 100%, because not all 4-digit SITC codes are attributed to one of the three 
categories. Table 1 shows information on total trade flows, classified according to 1-digit 
SITC codes and the three Rauch groups.  
 
 
 11 
 Table 1. Shares of differentiated, reference priced goods and goods traded on organized 
exchanges in 1-digit SITC product groups 
Notes: N = Differentiated goods, R = Reference priced goods and W = goods traded on an organized exchange. 
Numbers between square brackets show the importance (in percentages) of each 1-digit SITC group for the 
whole category, whereas the main figures in each column show the total value of trade for each 4-digit SITC-
group and its subdivision in %. For example, when we look at SITC-group 0, total trade value is 282 billion, 
which can be subdivided in 19% N, 46% R, 34% W and 1% not classified. Trade in the SITC-group 0 accounts 
for 5% of total trade, 2% of N, 15% of R, 17% of W, and 1% of not classified. 
 
The Table reveals that SITC group 7 (machinery and transport equipment) is by far the most 
important SITC group in terms of trade: 44% of total trade value is in this category. As the 
whole group falls under the category of heterogeneous products, it even accounts for almost 
60% of total trade in heterogeneous products. Second largest are the manufactured goods 
(SITC 6), which are more or less equally divided over the heterogeneous and reference priced 
goods. Manufactured goods together with chemicals (SITC 5) are the most important 
reference priced goods and cover about two thirds of trade in that category. Goods traded on 
world exchange are predominantly mineral fuels (SITC 3, 60%).  
Product group Trade value 
billions US$ 
Share of N 
in % 
Share of R 
in % 
Share of W 
in % 
Share of not 
classified % 
0: food and live animals 
 
282 [5] 19 [2] 46 [15] 34 [17] 1 [1] 
1: beverages and tobacco 
 
46 [1] 10 [0] 79 [4] 9 [1] 2 [0] 
2: crude materials, 
inedible, except fuels 
178 [3] 31 [2] 48 [10] 21 [7] 0 [0] 
3: mineral fuels, lubricants 
and related materials 
430 [8] 1 [0] 12 [6] 78 [60] 9 [7] 
4: animal and vegetable 
oils, fats and waxes 
14 [0] 9 [0] 10 [0] 63 [2] 18 [0] 
5: chemicals and related 
products 
513 [10] 46 [7] 53 [32] 1 [1] 0 [0] 
6: manufactured goods 
 
721 [14] 45 [10] 39 [33] 9 [12] 7 [10] 
7: machinery and transport 
equipment 
2310 [44] 85 [59] 0 [0] 0 [0] 15 [66] 
8: miscellaneous 
manufactured articles 
697 [13] 95 [20] 0 [0] 0 [0] 5 [7] 
9: commodities and 
transactions n.e.s. 
101 [2] 50 [2] 0 [0] 5 [1] 45 [9] 
Total 5292 [100] 64  [100] 16 [100] 10 [100] 10 [100] 
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4.2 Multidimensional distance  
A main contribution of our analysis is the introduction of multiple dimensions of distance, 
with an explicit distinction between cultural and institutional differences. We use these 
distance measures in addition to the links variable used by Rauch (1999), which indicates 
whether or not two countries share a language or have colonial ties. It is constructed as a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if both countries share a common language or one country has 
ever colonized the other country. The data on languages and colonial ties have been compiled 
by CEPII.  
Regarding the role of cultural differences, previous research has typically used 
measures of cultural (un)familiarity, such as dummy variables indicating whether the trading 
partners share a common language, religion, and colonial past (e.g., Srivastava and Green, 
1986; Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002; De Groot et al., 2004). We use the same measure for 
cultural (dis)similarity as Linders et al. (2005), which is based on the well-established cultural 
framework of Hofstede (1980; 2001). In our construction we use his four original cultural 
dimensions: (i) power distance, (ii) uncertainly avoidance, (iii) individualism and (iv) 
masculinity.4 Our measure captures the extent of differences in norms and values between 
countries, and hence allows us to go beyond more traditional measures of cultural familiarity. 
We also use a refined measure of institutional distance. Previous research has 
measured the institutional dissimilarity between trading partners through a dummy variable 
indicating whether the partners had comparable governance quality levels (De Groot et al., 
2004). We use a cardinal measure that captures the extent to which these quality levels differ. 
Our measure of institutional distance is based on Kaufmann et al. (2003). They constructed 
six indicators for the quality of institutions. These indicators are (i) voice and accountability, 
(ii) political stability, (iii) government effectiveness, (iv) regulatory quality, (v) rule of law 
and (vi) control of corruption.  
Bilateral cultural and institutional distance are both measured using the Kogut-Singh 
(1988) index. This index provides a single comparative measure based on the differences 
between two countries in multiple dimensions. It is constructed by taking a weighted average 
of the squared difference in each dimension. With D dimensions this yields:  
 
 ∑
−
=
=
D
d d
djdi
ij V
SS
D
KS
1
2)(1
, (3) 
                                               
4
 Later Hofstede added long-term orientation as a fifth dimension, but it is available for only a few countries and 
therefore not included here. 
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where KSij is the (Kogut-Singh) distance variable, Sdi is the value of dimension d for country i, 
Sdj is the value of dimension d for country j, and Vd is the sample variance in dimension d. 
A description of data and data sources concerning the other explanatory variables 
included in our gravity model, such as GDP, GDP per capita and physical distance, is 
provided in the Appendix.  
 
4.3 Estimation method 
Although most countries do trade with each other, they do not necessarily trade in every 
product category. Given our focus on trade at a disaggregate level, this implies that there are a 
number of zero-trade-flows in our sample. Simply neglecting the zero flows may seriously 
bias the results of an OLS regression analysis based on a loglinear transformation of the 
gravity equation. The 55 countries from our sample have 2752 bilateral trade flows, out of a 
possible 2916. When only the products traded on organised exchanges are considered, only 
2265 country pairs with a positive trade flow remain. This amount of zero flows can get much 
larger as more specific product groups are considered. At a 1-digit SITC level as much as 
60% (SITC 4) of the country pairs do not trade.  
In order to address the potential bias caused by the neglect of zero-flows, we estimate 
a sample selection model to take into account zero-valued bilateral trade flows in the sample. 
This model, also known as the Tobit II model (Verbeek, 2004), specifies a probit selection 
equation for the decision whether or not to trade, in addition to the standard log-linear gravity 
equation that models the volume of bilateral trade.5 Economic reasoning suggests that the 
selection equation should at least contain those explanatory variables also included in the 
gravity equation.  
The sample selection model can be estimated using two different approaches. First, the 
parameters in both parts of the model can be jointly estimated using maximum likelihood. 
Alternatively, the model can be estimated in two steps (Heckman, 1979). The first step 
estimates a probit selection equation using maximum likelihood. From the parameter 
estimates in the selection equation, we can compute the inverse Mill’s ratio for each country 
                                               
5
 Alternatively, some authors estimate the gravity model using Poisson regression (e.g., Santos-Silva and 
Tenreyro, 2006). However, Poisson regression pertains mostly to a context in which data are counts, rather than 
(essentially continuous) monetary values. Furthermore, Poisson estimation does not work well if outcomes are 
(very) large. So far, the discussion on the appropriateness and value-added of Poisson methods in this context 
remains an open issue in the literature. See, for example, Martinez-Zarzoso et al. (2007) for a critique of Poisson 
regression in the context of modelling bilateral trade patterns. Therefore, we prefer to pertain to the conventional 
log-linear specification and concomitant estimation methods, using a selection model to explicitly acknowledge 
the special nature of zero flows.  
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pair, denoted λij (also known as Heckman’s lambda). If we include Heckman’s lambda as an 
additional regressor in the second-stage estimation of the gravity equation, the remaining 
residual is uncorrelated with the selection outcome, and the gravity model parameters can be 
estimated consistently with OLS. The parameter estimated for Heckman’s lambda in the 
second-stage regression captures initial selection bias in the residual of the gravity equation.  
In our estimations, we use the first approach, based on full maximum likelihood 
estimation of the parameters in the sample selection model. There are two reasons for this, as 
described by Verbeek (2004). First, the two-step estimator is generally inefficient and the 
OLS regression provides incorrect standard errors, because the remaining residual is 
heteroskedastic, and λij is not directly observed but estimated from the first-stage regression 
estimates. Second, the two-step approach will not work very well if λij varies little across 
observations and is close to being linear in the regressors. This is related to potential 
identification problems that occur if the explanatory variables in the selection and regression 
equation are identical. In this case, the two-stage sample selection model is only identified 
because λij is a non-linear function of the regressors whereas these regressors enter (log-) 
linearly in the gravity equation (see Vella, 1998). The full maximum likelihood estimation 
provides an integrated approach to estimate the parameters in both the selection and 
regression equations, instead of relying on the second-stage estimation of an extended (log-) 
linear gravity equation using OLS. To conform to earlier empirical applications in trade 
modelling, we have included an additional regressor in the selection equation nevertheless.  
On the matter of identification, Verbeek (2004, p. 232) notes that: “the inclusion of 
[regressor] variables in [the selection equation] in addition to those [already in the regression 
model] can be important for identification in the second step”, but adds: “often there are no 
natural candidates and any choice is easily criticized”. We follow Helpman et al. (2007) in 
using an indicator for common religion as an additional regressor in the selection equation for 
this purpose. However, if this regressor is incorrectly omitted from the gravity equation, the 
estimation results may suffer from omitted variables bias and lead to spurious conclusions on 
the existence of sample selection bias (Verbeek, 2004). To perform some sensitivity analysis 
on the implied exclusion restriction with respect to the religion variable, we also estimate a 
sample selection model including the religion indicator in the gravity equation as well. 
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5. Results 
This section discusses the results of our analyses. Section 5.1 updates the analysis by Rauch 
(1999) by (i) considering a more recent time period and (ii) applying recently developed 
estimation techniques. Section 5.2 then continues by elaborating on the importance of other 
intangible barriers to trade. In Section 5.3, we look at more disaggregate product groups.  
 
5.1 An update of Rauch (1999)  
The results in Table 2 are obtained using a specification similar to the specification used by 
Rauch (1999). Our analysis is based on data for 2000, whereas Rauch used data for 1990. A 
minor difference in specification is that we include a generic dummy for common trade bloc 
membership while Rauch (1999) included a dummy for common membership of the EEC and 
for common membership of the EFTA. Table 2 shows the results for the total amount of trade, 
the trade in heterogeneous goods (N), trade in referenced priced goods (R) and trade in goods 
which are traded on organised exchanges (W). The coefficients are estimated using Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) with a balanced sample. Only the country pairs that have a positive 
amount in all four groups are included in the analysis. From the 2970 possible country pairs, 
2142 (72%) have a positive amount of trade in each of these categories. 
The results in Table 2 are comparable with those obtained by Rauch (1999) for the 
year 1990, which is the most recent year he used. The explained variation of trade is of the 
same order of magnitude, ranging from around 0.4 for homogeneous goods to around 0.7 for 
heterogeneous goods and aggregate trade. Also the signs and sizes of the estimated 
coefficients are comparable. We find a similar pattern for the GDP and per capita GDP 
coefficients, which tend to decrease as one moves from trade in heterogeneous goods towards 
trade in goods that are traded on organized exchanges. However, we do not find a clear 
pattern for the effect of links. The size of the adjacency effect is clearly increasing as the 
products become more homogeneous. For goods traded on organized exchanges the adjacency 
effect is particularly high.   
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Table 2. An update of Rauch’s analysis – I  
Dependent variable: ln(total trade value) ln(trade value N) ln(trade value R) ln(trade value W) 
  Total Differentiated Reference priced Organized exchange 
Specification Rauch Rauch Rauch Rauch 
       
ln(GDP product) 
 0.83*** 0.96*** 0.81*** 0.74*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
ln(per capita GDP product) 0.57*** 0.74*** 0.51*** 0.16*** 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
ln(distance) 
 – 0.66*** – 0.81*** – 0.67*** – 0.66*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) 
Adjacency 
 0.22** – 0.03 0.33*** 0.75*** 
 (0.11) (0.15) (0.10) (0.17) 
Links 
 0.56*** 0.66*** 0.60*** 0.61*** 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) 
Common trade bloc 
membership 
0.68***  0.78*** 0.89*** 0.82*** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) 
Method OLS OLS  OLS OLS 
Country dummies No No no No 
R2-Adjusted  0.75 0.69 0.67 0.40 
Total observations  2142 2142 2142 2142 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at a 10%, 5% or 1% level is indicated by *, 
**
 or ***, respectively. 
 
In Table 3 we expand the previous analysis by adding country-specific dummies to control for 
country-specific multilateral trade resistance, consistent with Anderson and Van Wincoop 
(2003). The effects of GDP and distance tend to increase whereas the effect of a common 
trade bloc membership decreases. The effect of links now also has a clear pattern, being high 
for heterogeneous goods and relatively small for goods traded on organized exchanges. It is 
also interesting to see that the effect of sharing a common border becomes much smaller for 
referenced price goods and for goods traded on organized exchanges. At the same time, 
distance decay becomes more pronounced. The estimators for distance and for the adjacency 
dummy are closely related to each other, as the positive result for a common border is partly 
caused by mismeasurement of the distance (Head and Mayer, 2007). This may suggest that 
the distance effect can be estimated more accurately, or that the functional form works better 
when including country dummies. 
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Table 3. An update of Rauch’s analysis – II (including country dummies) 
Dependent variable: ln(total trade value) ln(trade value N) Ln(trade value R) ln(trade value W) 
  Total Differentiated Reference priced Organized exchange 
Specification Rauch + 
country dummies 
Rauch + 
country dummies 
Rauch + 
country dummies 
Rauch + 
country dummies 
       
ln(GDP product) 
 0.79*** 0.90*** 0.85*** 0.73*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) 
ln(per capita GDP product) 1.04*** 1.22*** 0.69*** 0.68*** 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) 
ln(distance) 
 – 0.72*** – 0.78*** – 0.86*** – 0.95*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) 
Adjacency 
 0.23* 0.17 0.14 0.37* 
 (0.13) (0.16) (0.13) (0.20) 
Links 
 0.53*** 0.66*** 0.60*** 0.36*** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) 
Common trade bloc 
membership 
0.60***  0.68*** 0.64*** 0.69*** 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) 
Method OLS OLS  OLS OLS 
Country dummies 54 54 54 54 
R2-Adjusted  0.82 0.78 0.76 0.49 
Total observations  2142 2142 2142 2142 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at a 10%, 5% or 1% level is indicated by *, 
**
 or ***, respectively. 
 
We now apply the sample selection model instead of OLS. The results are depicted in Table 
4. The use of the selection model only marginally changes the results. 
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Table 4. An update of Rauch’s analysis – III (Heckman selection model)  
Dependent variable: Ln(total trade value) ln(trade value N) ln(trade value R) ln(trade value W) 
  Total Differentiated Reference priced Organized exchange 
Specification Rauch + 
country dummies 
Rauch + 
country dummies 
Rauch + 
Country dummies 
Rauch + 
country dummies 
       
ln(GDP product) 
 0.82*** 0.88*** 0.85*** 0.72*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) 
ln(per capita GDP product) 1.09*** 1.26*** 0.67*** 0.65*** 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.10) 
ln(distance) 
 – 0.85*** – 0.81*** – 0.92*** – 0.95*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) 
Adjacency 
 0.08 0.12 0.06 0.39* 
 (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.23) 
Links 
 0.61*** 0.69*** 0.63*** 0.31** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) 
Common trade bloc 
membership 
0.56***  0.63*** 0.65*** 0.71*** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.13) 
Method Heckman Heckman Heckman Heckman 
Country dummies 54 54 54 54 
Uncensored obs. 2752 2627 2586 2265 
Censored obs.  164 289 330 651 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at a 10%, 5% or 1% level is indicated by *, 
**
 or ***, respectively. 
 
There is a clear pattern present for five variables: GDP, GDP per capita, distance, links and 
common trade bloc membership. The GDP coefficient for differentiated goods (0.88) is 
higher than for referenced priced goods (0.85) and for goods traded at organised exchanges 
(0.72). A similar pattern was found by Rauch (1999). The pattern for the GDP per capita is 
even more pronounced, ranging from 1.26 for heterogeneous goods to 0.65 for homogeneous 
goods. This suggests that heterogeneous goods are income elastic while homogeneous goods 
are income inelastic. Since we use the product of GDP per capita of the exporter and the 
importer, it is also possible that high-income countries export relatively more heterogeneous 
goods than homogeneous goods. This could be caused by comparative advantages of high-
income countries for heterogeneous goods.  
For the links variable we also find the same pattern as Rauch (1999). For all three 
product categories trade will be higher when the trading partners have colonial links or share 
a common language. The size of this effect increases with the extent of differentiation of the 
products. This is one of the main conclusions of Rauch (1999) and is consistent with his 
network/search theory.  
According to the network/search view, distance would reduce trade in heterogeneous 
goods more than it would reduce trade in homogeneous goods. The results of Rauch (1999) 
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confirmed this hypothesis and are consistent with those found in Table 2. However, when we 
add country dummies (Table 3) and apply the Heckman selection model (Table 4), the results 
suggest the opposite effect. Physical distance reduces trade more for homogeneous goods. A 
possible explanation for this is that for homogeneous goods, exactly the same good can be 
imported from many countries. Because of the nature of these goods, it does not matter where 
the goods come from. Heterogeneous goods are probably produced in fewer places. 
Moreover, if similar but differentiated goods are produced in multiple places, they may vary 
in quality, giving more reason to trade the goods over a larger distance. Second, when goods 
are traded on organised exchanges, intangible trade costs probably play a smaller role. There 
is less need for negotiation over the properties of the product or the price. Therefore, the 
importance of tangible costs like transportation costs, relative to the importance of intangible 
transaction costs, is likely to be higher for homogeneous goods than it is for heterogeneous 
goods. Though this may either increase or decrease distance decay, depending on the relative 
importance of transportation costs and intangible transaction costs in explaining the marginal 
effect of distance on trade. 
Tariffs are also a form of tangible trade costs. The idea behind the common trade bloc 
variable is that it acts as a proxy for tariffs and other forms of trade protection, which should 
be lower when both countries are a member of the same trade bloc. Common trade bloc 
membership can therefore be expected to be more important for homogeneous goods. This is 
confirmed by the pattern for the trade bloc coefficient. This coefficient is, like the distance 
coefficient, higher for the group of products that is traded on organised exchanges (0.71) than 
for referenced priced goods (0.65) and for differentiated goods (0.63). An alternative 
explanation is that trade protection is more severe for goods traded on organised exchanges.  
 
5.2 The impact of cultural and institutional distance 
We now turn to the impact of cultural and institutional dissimilarities. Table 5 extends the 
specification with two variables reflecting these intangible barriers to trade. The coefficients 
for the other variables, that were already included in Table 4, are hardly affected by the 
inclusion of institutional and cultural distance, so we will focus on the results for institutional 
and cultural distance. Based on the discussion in Section 3, the expected sign of the effect of 
cultural and institutional distance is ambiguous. On the one hand a negative effect on bilateral 
trade could be expected, because trade costs increase with cultural and institutional distance. 
Then the negative effect is expected to be more pronounced for goods that are more 
differentiated, because higher asset-specific investments in trade relations imply a greater risk 
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of exposure to differences in culture and institutional quality. However, on the other hand, 
high cultural and institutional differences lower the attractiveness of serving foreign markets 
with FDI and may lead to substitution by trade flows. The total effect of cultural and 
institutional distance on trade could then even be positive. The empirical analysis is needed to 
assess the relative importance of both opposite powers. 
 
Table 5. The role of cultural and institutional distance 
Dependent variable: ln(total trade value) ln(trade value N) ln(trade value R) ln(trade value W) 
  Total Differentiated Reference priced Organized exchange 
Specification Rauch + 
country dummies 
Rauch + 
country dummies 
Rauch + 
country dummies 
Rauch + 
country dummies 
       
Ln(GDP product) 
 0.83*** 0.88*** 0.85*** 0.71*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) 
Ln(per capita GDP product) 1.08*** 1.24*** 0.71*** 0.67*** 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) 
Ln(distance) 
 – 0.86*** – 0.82*** – 0.91*** – 0.93*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) 
Adjacency 
 0.09 0.13 0.00 0.39* 
 (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.23) 
Links 
 0.62*** 0.71*** 0.62*** 0.25* 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.13) 
Common trade bloc 
membership 
0.57***  0.62*** 0.60*** 0.78*** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.13) 
Cultural distance 0.02 0.04 – 0.02 – 0.11*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
Institutional distance 
 0.01 – 0.01 – 0.06*** 0.10*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Method Heckman Heckman Heckman Heckman 
Country dummies 54 54 54 54 
Uncensored obs. 2752 2627 2586 2265 
Censored obs.  164 289 330 651 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at a 10%, 5% or 1% level is indicated by *, 
**
 or ***, respectively. 
 
The empirical findings reported in Table 5 provide support for the latter explanation. Cultural 
and institutional distance are statistically insignificant determinants for total trade and trade in 
group N (which accounts for the bulk of the total trade). Furthermore, the coefficient of 
cultural distance is becoming more negative as the product groups become more 
homogeneous. This result contradicts the expectation from the first explanation that cultural 
distance is especially important for heterogeneous goods and that cultural distance is less 
important for goods that are traded on organised exchanges, because trade occurs at arms’ 
length. This latter group is the only product group where cultural distance has a statistically 
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significant negative effect on trade. For institutional distance the results do not confirm the 
traditional hypothesis either. This variable is insignificant for aggregate bilateral trade and 
trade in heterogeneous goods, significant and negative for reference priced goods, and 
significant and positive for goods traded on organised exchanges.  
 Substitution between trade and FDI provides a possible explanation for the pattern of 
cultural distance that we find. The findings for the three product groups could be interpreted, 
according to this line of thought, as follows: the substitution effect from FDI to trade appears 
to increase as products are less homogeneous. This could actually reflect that the 
substitutability of different suppliers in trade is smaller for more differentiated goods, 
implying that the bilateral relation changes form in the face of higher cultural and institutional 
distance. For homogeneous goods, on the other hand, importers may rely on exporters that are 
relatively close in terms of culture and institutions. Substituting away in both trade and FDI 
relations from suppliers that are more distant is easier. This line of reasoning is consistent 
with the findings for the effect of cultural distance on trade across product groups. A 
qualification on this explanation should be that, ceteris paribus, we expect FDI to be a more 
attractive option for differentiated types of goods. Because trade costs related to search and 
insecurity are expected to be higher for more differentiated goods, FDI becomes relatively 
more attractive. Because these trade costs increase more with distance and other barriers, 
while FDI costs increase similarly for all types of goods, we would expect a smaller 
percentage substitution from FDI to trade for differentiated goods.  
 The pattern for institutional distance does not correspond to the hierarchy following 
from the FDI-trade substitution, however. It could be expected that institutional distance does 
not have a strong effect on trade in group W, because country-specific institutions are not that 
relevant for goods that are traded on organized exchanges. Organized exchanges form an 
institutional framework in itself. The effect, however, is actually significantly positive, 
suggesting a high substitution from FDI to trade. A possible explanation for this is that 
homogeneous goods are generally produced by countries with relatively low institutional 
quality and exported to countries with relatively high institutional quality.6  
                                               
6
 We have also included institutional quality as a separate explanatory variable (although it is strongly correlated 
with GDP per capita). Institutional quality especially stimulates trade for the differentiated product group, which 
accounts for the bulk of the total trade. For reference priced goods and goods that are traded on organized 
exchanges, the institutional quality does not significantly increase trade. This confirms the prediction of the 
insecurity view on trade costs that the effectiveness of the formal institutional framework of a country in 
enforcing property rights matters particularly for differentiated products and not so much for homogeneous 
goods. In specifications that include country dummies, the level of institutional quality is controlled for by the 
dummy parameters.  
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5.3 More detailed product groups 
The above results clearly reveal that the effects of tangible and intangible barriers to trade 
vary according to the type of product that is being traded. As a final extension to the analysis 
we now look at even more disaggregate product groups. We consider the ten 1-digit product 
categories distinguished in the SITC classification. The results are presented in Table 6.  
 A result that stands out is the substantial heterogeneity in the estimated coefficients for 
the different product groups. The GDP variable, for example, ranges from 0.51 to 0.90. The 
GDP per capita variable has an even larger range, between 0.47 and 1.54. Striking is also the 
variation in the impact of physical distance ranging from –0.56 for beverages and tobacco to  
–1.42 for mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials. The markets for the latter goods can 
thus be characterized as highly localized.  
There are three product groups (SITC 0, 2 and 4) that have a relatively low coefficient 
for GDP per capita and a relatively high coefficient for the trade bloc variable. As such, the 
results for these three categories strongly resemble those of the goods traded on organized 
exchanges (see Table 5). As shown in Table 1, these three product groups also contain 
relatively high shares of homogeneous products.  
An interesting result is that cultural distance has a negative coefficient for all 1-digit 
product groups, except for machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7), for which it is 
significantly positive. This product group has a particularly large share in total trade. Table 1 
shows that machinery and transport equipment account for over 40% of the total trade 
between the countries in our sample. This implies that this product group is probably 
responsible for the insignificant effect which was found for total trade and trade in 
heterogeneous goods. For the other product groups, culture does seem to impose a barrier to 
trade.7 When ignoring all trade in SITC 7, cultural distance has a coefficient of –0.04, with a 
p-value of 0.1. 
 
                                               
7
 The effect of cultural distance on food and live animals (SITC 0) is not particularly large, even though this 
product group is generally considered as a culture-specific product. This could be explained by a preference for 
variety. Since some food-related products are only produced in certain countries, they can only be imported from 
countries with a different culture. This effect would reduce the negative effect of cultural distance on trade.  
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Table 6. Results for SITC 1 product groups 
Dependent 
variable: 
ln(0: food and 
live animals) 
ln(1: beverages 
and tobacco) 
ln(2: crude 
materials, 
inedible, except 
fuels) 
ln(3: mineral 
fuels, lubricants 
and related 
materials) 
ln(4: animal and 
vegetable oils, fats 
and waxes) 
Specification Rauch + 
country dummies 
Rauch + 
country dummies 
Rauch + 
country dummies 
Rauch + 
country dummies 
Rauch + 
country dummies 
        
ln(GDP product) 
 0.82*** 0.53*** 0.90*** 0.51*** 0.80*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0.08) 
ln(per capita GDP 
product) 
0.67*** 1.14*** 0.47*** 0.77*** 0.54*** 
(0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.15) (0.14) 
ln(distance) 
 – 0.62*** – 0.56*** – 0.66*** – 1.42*** – 0.64*** 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.12) (0.10) 
Adjacency 
 0.36* 0.48** 0.30* 0.54* 0.64*** 
 (0.19) (0.23) (0.17) (0.30) (0.24) 
Links 
 0.54*** 0.64*** 0.44*** – 0.22 0.45*** 
 (0.10) (0.14) (0.10) (0.18) (0.16) 
Common trade 
bloc membership 
0.99***  0.54*** 0.70*** 0.37* 0.79*** 
 (0.11) (0.14) (0.10) (0.20) (0.16) 
Cultural distance 
– 0.05* – 0.16*** – 0.03 – 0.16*** – 0.10** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
Institutional 
distance 
 0.06 – 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.09** 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) 
Method Heckman Heckman Heckman Heckman Heckman 
Country dummies 54 54 54 54 54 
Uncensored obs. 2373 1368 2250 1425 1122 
Censored obs.  543 1548 666 1491 1794 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at a 10%, 5% or 1% level is indicated by *, 
**
 or ***, respectively. 
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Table 6 (continued). Results for SITC 1 product groups 
Dependent 
variable: 
ln(5: chemicals 
and related 
products) 
ln(6: 
manufactured 
goods) 
ln(7: machinery 
and transport 
equipment) 
ln(8: 
miscellaneous 
manufactured 
articles) 
ln(9: commodities 
and transactions 
n.e.s.) 
Specification Rauch + 
country dummies 
Rauch + 
country dummies 
Rauch + 
country dummies 
Rauch + 
country dummies 
Rauch + 
country dummies 
        
ln(GDP product) 
 0.81*** 0.86*** 0.83*** 0.90*** 0.64*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) 
ln(per capita GDP 
product) 
0.94*** 0.58*** 1.54*** 1.31*** 1.42*** 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.13) 
ln(distance) 
 – 1.02*** – 0.93*** – 0.70*** – 0.77*** – 0.53*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) 
Adjacency 
 0.02 0.15 0.32 0.18 0.49* 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.19) (0.17) (0.30) 
Links 
 0.56*** 0.49*** 0.61*** 0.83*** 0.15 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.17) 
Common trade 
bloc membership 
0.40***  0.60*** 0.74*** 0.53*** 0.91*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.17) 
Cultural distance 
– 0.04 – 0.06** 0.05* – 0.03 – 0.09* 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
Institutional 
distance 
 – 0.07*** – 0.05*** – 0.02 – 0.04 – 0.05 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) 
Method Heckman Heckman Heckman Heckman Heckman 
Country dummies 54 54 54 54 54 
Uncensored obs. 2321 2467 2307 2223 1283 
Censored obs.  595 449 609 693 1633 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at a 10%, 5% or 1% level is indicated by *, 
**
 or ***, respectively. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has focused on the importance of intangible barriers to trade in explaining 
variation in bilateral trade. As such, the analysis expands in several ways upon the seminal 
work by Rauch (1999). The new elements as compared to Rauch are that (i) we consider a 
more recent time period, (ii) we apply more appropriate estimation techniques, (iii) we 
consider intangible barriers to trade in much more detail, and (iv) we consider more refined 
product categories.  
Our results confirm the network/search theory specified in Rauch (1999) with respect 
to the effect of linguistic or colonial links. The effect of linguistic or colonial links is larger 
for more differentiated goods. However, geographical distance shows the opposite pattern 
when we control for omitted variable bias due to multilateral resistances and account for 
selection bias due to zero valued trade flows:.it is most important for trade in homogeneous 
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goods. This qualifies the importance of distance for search costs relative to more traditional 
transportation barriers. The analysis of additional cultural and institutional distance variables 
suggests that these effects are rather different for different product types. Cultural distance 
exercises a negative influence and institutional distance a positive influence on goods traded 
on organized exchanges, while both variables are statistically insignificant for trade in 
differentiated goods. A possible explanation for the positive effect can be found in the trade-
off between FDI and trade. Zooming in on more disaggregated product groups provides 
further insights on the effect of different dimensions of distance. An interesting result is that 
for nine out of ten groups cultural distance does have a negative effect on trade. 
Although some clear patterns are discernible from the presented evidence, our results 
also point to a number of opportunities for future research. Particularly promising is to delve 
deeper into the determination of more homogeneous product groups, extending the 
classification into three groups proposed by Rauch (1999). An interesting way forward could 
be to consider trade for more refined product groups and classify them into homogeneous 
groups based on key characteristics of gravity equations estimated for these groups. Such 
classifications should acknowledge the multidimensionality of distance. Analyses for more 
refined product groups will further increase our understanding of the product-specific barriers 
to trade and as such have substantial policy implications in view of the continued attempts to 
further enhance free trade and exploit the returns from specialization. More attention should 
also be devoted to the proximity-concentration trade off. So far, we have considered trade in 
isolation and thus neglected foreign direct investments as an alternative mode of entering 
foreign markets. Also for foreign direct investments, the pay-off from considering 
investments at a disaggregate level is likely to be substantial, although data problems are 
particularly severe in this research domain.  
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Appendix. Description of the dataset 
The variables included in the analysis and their respective sources are as follows:  
• For the size of the countries we use the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Additionally 
we include a variable for the GDP per capita. Both GDP and GDP per capita are 
obtained for the year 2000 from the Penn World Table, Mark 6.2.  
• The distance between each pair of countries is obtained from the Centre d’Etudes 
Prospectives et d’Information Internationales (CEPII). This database offers several 
measures of distance. This study uses the simple distances, which are obtained from 
the latitudes and longitudes of the city with the largest population count in the country. 
This distance is measured ‘as the crow flies’ by the great circle formula and is 
measured in kilometres. Alternative measures for distance use the capital city rather 
than the city with the largest population or take the population distributions into 
account. The city with the largest population is chosen here because it is expected to 
be a better indicator for economic activity than the capital city.  
• The adjacency variable is a dummy which equals 1 when the two countries included in 
the country pair are adjacent. Countries are considered to be adjacent when they have 
a land border or a small body of water as a border. The adjacency variable is also 
obtained from the CEPII database.  
• The data on trade blocs are obtained from OECD data. A distinction is made between 
24 different trade blocs. A dummy variable is constructed which equals 1 if both 
countries are a member of at least one mutual trade bloc in the year 2000 and 0 
otherwise. The trade blocs considered are: EU, CANUS, NAFTA, APEC, ANDEAN, 
CACM, MERCOSUR, GR3, LAIA, CARICOM, CBI, EAC, EMCCA, ECOWAS, 
CMESA, IOC, SADC, ECWA, WAEMU, SACU, ECCGL, ASEAN, GCC and 
SAARC. 
• The instrument we use in the Heckman selection model (see also Section 4.3) is a 
variable that indicates whether two countries have the same main religion. This 
dummy variable is constructed using data from the CIA World Factbook. These data 
are obtained from surveys at different points in time. The surveys are not all taken in 
the year 2000, but this should not have a significant effect because the main religion of 
a country is very persistent over time. The CIA World Factbook provides data on the 
fraction of the population that practice certain religions. Since there are many similar 
religions, for this study they have been aggregated into seven groups: Buddhists, 
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Catholics, Hindus, Jews, Muslims, Orthodox-Christians, and Protestants. For each 
country the religion practiced by the highest portion of the population is marked as the 
main religion. The dummy variable is constructed by assigning a value of 1 if the 
countries have the same main religion and a value of 0 if they do not. 
 
The countries included in the analysis (in alphabetical order) are Argentina, Australia, 
Austria, Belgium Luxembourg, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, 
Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Saudi Arabia, India, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Thailand, Turkey, Egypt, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela.8 
 
 
                                               
8
 Compared to the set of countries used by Rauch, our sample does not contain Yugoslavia, which did no longer 
exist in 2000. Algeria, Bolivia, Iceland, Taiwan, Paraguay, Sudan and Tunisia are excluded because of a lack of 
data on the cultural indicators.  
